It’s 6 a.m. in a coastal Alaskan village. The temperature hovers around -20°F. A single control room miles away monitors the community’s lifelines: the water pumps that keep pipes from freezing, the fuel tanks that feed generators, and the treatment systems that make the water safe to drink. Suddenly, a pump alarm blinks red. An operator thousands of miles away tries to log in, only to find the system unresponsive. Within minutes, water pressure drops, and the backup generator begins to overload. In this moment, one compromised password could mean frozen pipes, contaminated water, and an entire community plunged into emergency mode. It’s a risk that’s all too real: this kind of scenario is already happening across the United States.

West Texas Water Systems (January–April 2024)

Multiple small towns reported compromises of water control systems. In Muleshoe, TX, attackers used the HMI to turn pumps on, overflowing a storage tank; linked assessments tied the operation to the pro-Russia group “CyberArmyofRussia_Reborn”, with reporting connecting that front to Russia’s Sandworm/APT44. U.S. intelligence summarized that on Jan 18, 2024, attackers accessed control systems at two Texas facilities, tampering with pumps/alarms so tanks ran past shutoff levels.

Key weaknesses: Internet-reachable or weakly protected OT HMIs; inadequate segmentation between Internet/IT and plant controls; remote access without strong authentication/monitoring.

IEC 62443 lessons:

💠 Put HMIs/PLCs in restricted zones; allow only whitelisted conduits (protocols/ports) through firewalled gateways.

💠 Network monitoring for OT (baseline HMI activity, alarm changes).

💠 Supplier/role clarity so integrators/operators know who secures remote links and how (policies, audits).

Colonial Pipeline, U.S. (May 2021)

A ransomware intrusion in IT systems prompted a proactive shutdown of the nation’s largest refined-fuel pipeline to contain the spread while responding. Service restarted after several days. This halted fuel distribution temporarily across multiple states, triggering supply shortages and economic disruption.

Key weaknesses: IT compromise with insufficient containment boundaries between business and industrial operations, and limited fail-operational planning for extended IT outages.

IEC 62443 lessons:

💠 Separate IT and OT networks to stop ransomware from reaching control systems.

💠 Plan and test response playbooks so operations can continue if business systems go down.

💠 Monitor and secure conduits between networks using IEC 62443’s zone-and-conduit model.

Oldsmar, Florida (February 2021)

An operator saw the mouse cursor move on its own via remote-access software; the attacker briefly set sodium hydroxide from ~100 ppm to 11,100 ppm before the operator reversed it. Investigators noted legacy systems and remote access were central factors.

Key weaknesses: Unrestricted, always-on remote access; insufficient segmentation and monitoring around the HMI/PLC environment. IEC 62443 lessons:

💠 Apply Zones & Conduits to isolate operator HMIs/PLCs from corporate/remote services.

💠 Secure remote access: MFA, jump servers, time-boxed access, logging.

💠 Establish security levels and enforce least-privilege for engineering workstations/HMIs.

What Is IEC 62443?

IEC 62443 is the international cybersecurity framework designed specifically for operational technology (OT) and industrial control systems (ICS).

Key distinctions:

Unlike generic IT cybersecurity standards, IEC 62443 is purpose-built for operational technology environments, addressing the unique requirements of PLCs, SCADA networks, sensors, actuators, and the physical processes they control. The framework emphasizes a structured approach using Zones and Conduits to group assets by risk level and tightly manage how systems communicate, reducing opportunities for attackers to move laterally. It also defines security levels, clear role responsibilities, and a full lifecycle approach from initial assessment and design to implementation and ongoing maintenance, ensuring cybersecurity remains integral throughout a system’s lifespan. In essence, IEC 62443 protects both the digital and physical layers of critical infrastructure, making it especially valuable for Alaska’s essential utilities.

Why IEC 62443 Is Especially Relevant for Alaska

Remote & Harsh Environments

Many Alaskan facilities are far from major data centers, rely on satellite or long-haul communication, and often operate unattended for long periods. When an OT breach happens in these settings, the consequences multiply quickly.

Legacy Equipment + Connectivity

Older control systems were rarely built with cybersecurity in mind. Combine that with today’s push for remote operations in difficult terrain, and the attack surface expands dramatically. Studies show that many water utilities have exposed OT services: 145,000 + globally and 48,000 + in the U.S. alone.

Critical Infrastructure = High Stakes

Whether it’s a pipeline, a remote pump station, or a fuel depot for an isolated community, a disruption isn’t just inconvenient; it’s potentially life-threatening. IEC 62443’s segmentation model slows intruders, preventing contagion across systems.

Emerging Regulatory & Cyber Mandates

Federal agencies like CISA and the U.S. Department of Energy are aligning new requirements with OT/ICS frameworks such as IEC 62443. Early adoption means Alaska’s utilities won’t just be compliant; they’ll be resilient.

Putting IEC 62443 into Action: What It Means for Alaska

Gap assessments aligned with IEC 62443:

Identify where legacy systems lack segmentation, where remote links need hardening, and where vendor responsibilities are unclear.

Segmentation strategies (Zones & Conduits):

Separate your remote fuel-storage control system from the corporate network and strictly limit connections.

Clear roles & vendor management:

IEC 62443 defines accountability among owners, operators, integrators, and vendors, ensuring no gaps.

Secure remote access:

For infrastructure relying on satellite or modem links, enforce multi-factor authentication, segmentation, and continuous monitoring.

Lifecycle management:

Build security into upgrades, monitoring, maintenance, and incident response, not as an afterthought.

Incident planning & drills:

In remote regions, response times are longer. Test manual-operation scenarios and “dark sensor” drills.

Following the framework goes beyond installing a firewall; it means weaving cyber-resilience into every layer of system design and operation.

Our Commitment

At KEW we believe Alaska deserves resilient infrastructure built for its unique challenges. We help utilities and partners adopt IEC 62443-based solutions tailored for the terrain.

Ready to Get Started?

Contact us at info@koniagew.com or call us at 907-318-7801 to learn how IEC 62443 can strengthen your organization’s cyber-resilience today!